In the post-2022 context, it initially appeared that hardline Buddhist nationalist sentiments had waned with the fall of the Rajapaksa regime and the cross-communal solidarity expressed during the aragalaya, and Buddhist nationalist sentiments were re-emerging in a more diversified way. Since then, with the election of the NPP in 2024, there are continued shifts in these centres of power and in their rhetoric and politics of mobilisation.
In Trincomalee, the placement of a Buddha statue in a plot of land adjoining the Sri Sambuddha Jayanthi Bodhiraja Viharaya triggered a series of events that made national ripples. The temple had been established in 1951 and a presidential land grant in 2014 gave the temple access to land that is governed under the Coastal Conservation Act, which prohibits constructions without its permission. In the recent past, a temporary food stall has been set up with the consent of the temple incumbent. The Coast Conservation and Coastal Resource Management Department obtained a court order to remove the structure. This led to an attempt by a group of monks, notably Balangoda Kassapa Thero, to install a Buddha statue in the site. A confrontation ensued between the local police and this group, making headlines. The resulting backlash by the nationalist camp led to the NPP backtracking on its position and the Minister of Public Security explaining the action as a measure to ensure the statue’s safety, and the statue being subsequently replaced. The structure that was ordered to be removed by the court was later removed in compliance with the court order.
While previous attempts by the nationalist camp to mobilise Sinhala Buddhist sentiments through alarmist rhetoric centred on Tamil commemorations of Maveerar Day, the spectre of the re-emergence of the LTTE, and the government’s relatively muted marking of ‘War Victory’ Day on 19 May 2009 failed to gain significant traction, the Trincomalee incident marked a shift within the discourse. The government’s backtracking of its initial position on the statue showed its sensitivity to Sinhala Buddhist sentiments. Earlier that year, the government had attempted to appeal to these sentiments in the lead up to the local elections with the exposition of the Sacred Tooth Relic of Lord Budda. However, the arrest of four monks including Balangoda Kassapa Thero and six other people over allegations of violating the Coastal Conservation Act in the Trincomalee episode provided a ready platform for nationalist forces to regather.
The rising sensitivity of Sinhala sentiments became manifest when a significant public outcry was generated within days when local government authorities, in Koralai Pattu (Chenkalady) Pradeshiya Sabha and Kaluwanchikudy Pradeshiya Sabha in the Eastern Province, removed signboards that had been installed by the Department of Archaeology to identify and mark heritage site, on grounds that permission had not been obtained under the Pradeshiya Sabha law. The incident prompted a swift investigation by the police, with the central government maintaining that the sign boards did not require approval from Pradeshiya Sabhas. Subsequently, the Valaichchenai Magistrate’s Court ordered the reinstallation of the boards. This incident shows how incendiary any issue related to Sinhala Buddhism is, and this is despite the dip in nationalist politics since the Aragalaya and in the NPP government’s proactive anti-racist stance.
Shifts in NPP’s Response to Buddhist Nationalism
This proactive anti-racist stance of the NPP government sentiments came out in a recent statement made by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake during a public address in Jaffna in January 2026. Hinting at the contested Tissa Vihara in Thaiyiddy, Kankesanthurai, the President criticised those who travel from the South, bypassing the sacred Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi in Anuradhapura on Poya days to observe sil in the North. He alleged that they promote racism and spread hatred, rather than observing religious precepts. His comments sparked controversy and accusations of disrespecting the religiosity of Buddhists.
The President’s remarks are in the context of attempts at ‘reviving’ a temple that is ascribed a historical past, which is more recent in the making. In a 1964 map of the Survey Department, there is a Buddhist temple marked in the vicinity of the current claimed temple land. This land was allegedly abandoned during the war. Since 2018, a group of monks and supporters have been engaged in claiming adjacent land as that temple, with the aid of the military and the Governor at the time, Reginald Cooray. The land is contested by locals who hold title to the deeds. Protests have been held by local Tamils in front of the highly-guarded temple, and on Poya days, pilgrims from the South go in groups to observe sil at the temple. In the Buddhist narrative, it is claimed that this Buddhist site of worship has been established as early as the time of King Devanampiyathissa (c. 3rd BCE), despite weak archeological evidence to prove the claim.
The President’s comments mark a powerful challenge to Sinhala Buddhist privilege, which has become foundational to Sri Lankan statebuilding since independence. It follows a comparable statement made by the President during the 16th National War Heroes Commemoration Day in May 2025 when he referred to the military as ‘soldiers’ (sebalu) instead of ‘war heroes’ (ranaviru). These statements can be understood as attempts to challenge established centres of power outside the political establishment, such as the military and Buddhist establishments.
By the turn of 2026, a shift in gears in the way the government deals with the Buddhist establishment can be observed. Shortly before the president’s statement, the Minister of Agriculture, Livestock, Lands and Irrigations, Lal Kantha, had called the chief prelate of Mihintale, Walawahangunawawe Dhammarathana Thero, as a wanachariya, literally meaning savage, in response to the monk’s criticisms of the government’s education reforms agenda. Since the 2022 crisis, this Mihintale monk has been part of an emerging epicentre of dissent of the Sangha, in the face of ‘perceived and real’ loss of state patronage to religious establishments since the economic crisis and shrinking state fiscal capacity.
More recently, Prime Minister Dr Harini Amarasuriya was reported in Monaragala to have struck off pansil (Buddhist religious observations) from the event’s programme, which was part of a series of seminars aimed at building awareness on education reforms. The Buddhist monks who attended the event shared that about 15 clergy who came from an educational professional background were present; in the absence of pansil, some said that they had left the venue due to feeling disrespected. These positions adopted by frontline government leaders indicate the manifestation of a calculated political strategy on the part of government actors.
Sangha Anxieties and Demands
The apparent shift in the government’s political strategy towards taking on the Buddhist establishment must be contextualised against the entrenched, more structural anxieties of the sangha and the more recent dissatisfactions among them. Deep-rooted anxieties stem from the Sri Lankan Buddhist establishment’s long-standing attempts to exercise political authority and set the agenda of governments, rather than merely serving as a source of legitimation. In the context of the war, and post-war uptick of anti-Muslim rhetoric, these anxieties have manifested in various ways, including entering parliamentray politics, turning militant, and influencing political agenda-setting though social movements. The rise of liberal and secular political ideas and questions over the material benefits of constitutional tenets that privilege Buddhism as the foremost among other religions enables a feeling of necessity for political activism among the sangha. Secularism is perceived as a challenge to the Buddhist privilege in Sri Lanka, which in the articulation of some monks is a ‘theocratic country’ with no constitutionally recognised status.
Another main anxiety among the Buddhist sangha is their perceived loss of status due to challenges of modernisation and capitalism. Increasing derobing among ordained monks and dwindling enrolment rates of novice monks leading to temple closures are felt strongly. Further, the accelerating rate of erosion of social and intellectual leadership of the society that they occupied, due to poor education facilities in Pirivenas for novice monks, compared to lay students studying in well-resourced schools, is increasingly felt. These perceptions are exacerbated by their lack of access to English language education and the debilitating effects of addictive social media on younger cohorts of monks, which are perceived as existential threats to the Sangha establishment. The grievances about the present education system available for monks are criticised both for its lack of general relevance to prepare a novice monk to navigate the ‘material world’, as well as the education system’s lack of specificity and depth to prepare them as religious and erudite monks.
The exposure of the sangha to social media, where the traditional modes of deference no longer play out, have also cracked at the moral authority that the sangha wields and assumes. This is exacerbated by the rise of ‘entrepreneur monks’ who engage in various initiatives such as running businesses and temple models which make the whole sangha vulnerable to accusations of greed, corruption and abuse of religious authority. This has raised conversations on the need to introduce the Buddhist Temporal Ordinance (also known as the Theravadi Bhikku Kathikawath (Registration) Act, which is supposed to regulate the governance and discipline of Bikkhus in Sri Lanka. In its current form, the Buddhist establishment in Sri Lanka lacks clear authority to enforce disciplinary action on ‘deviant’ monks, such as expelling them from the sasana. This has led to anxieties that the actions of some wayward monks would be seen as representing the sangha and Buddhism as a whole. In this mix, the traditional divisions within the sangha along caste and regional lines (e.g., urban versus rural) also play out, where the highly hierarchical order of the sangha establishment is skewed against those at the lower rungs of it. These divisions have undermined efforts to enact the Kathikawath Panatha, due to divisions and mistrust among the sangha.
Sangha Samuluwa and a 10-Point Charter
The more immediate responses of the sangha are to the NPP government’s perceived neglect of, and antagonism towards, Buddhism, the sangha, and traditional values. In September 2025, the chief prelates of the three niyakas signed a joint communique emphasizing that ‘proposed amendments to the Penal Code introducing an offence for corporal punishment, as well as government initiatives to promote tourism through LGBTQ-related activities, could undermine cultural values and give rise to serious social catastrophes’. In addition, the chief Prelate of the Amarapura Nikaya in a letter to the President ‘condemned and rejected’ the actions of the police over the Trincolmalee Buddha statue incident. There was also grievance expressed over the Ministry of Buddha Sasana becoming ‘weakened and ineffective due to the absence of a responsible minister’. As illustrations of what was described as the erosion of monastic autonomy within this institution, two examples were cited. First, the position of Director of the Pirivena Section within the Ministry of Education, which has traditionally been held by a Buddhist monk, has reportedly been placed under the authority of an Additional Secretary, thereby reducing the institutional independence historically associated with the role.
Second, the Committee of Registrars of the Nikayas, whose members were previously appointed by the respective Nikayas themselves, was said to have been compromised by ministerial appointments, altering established procedures of internal religious governance.
In response to these developments, a group of senior monks called for a large-scale protest campaign, a ‘sangha samuluwa’ to address alleged injustice against the Buddha sasana, with regard to what they diagnose as inconsistent exercise of rule of law, assault of monks by police, and an organised attempt to undermine their influence through defamatory tactics. During the conference, a ten-point charter was presented, outlining a set of demands by the sangha gathering.
Within the sangha samuluwa, a few key dynamics are observed. Convened by monks who are known for their close association with past Rajapaksa regimes, the event was participated by around 500 monks. While in the lead-up to the event, the Asgiriya Anunayake Narampanawa Ananda Thero had called for calm amid criticism of Buddhist clergy, there were less senior monks representing the Asgiriya and Malwatta Chapters. Even in the Trincomalee state incident, the letter to the President had come from this Nikaya. These events point to the Amarapura Nikaya taking more initiative in reacting to the government, compared to the Siam and Ramanna Nikayas.
These dynamics nevertheless indicate growing consensus among the sangha over the government’s ‘lacking’ stance with regard to Buddhism. While the sangha samuluwa may be dismissed by some observers as a political, fringe sentiment, conversations with sangha in various parts of the country indicate that these grievances are widespread among them, and reflect the government’s actions (or inactions) but also the general inequality that is felt outside the more heavily patronised temples.
The NPP’s government’s secular approach needs to be contextualised against the above-listed Buddhist insecurities which when triggered, could be misinterpreted by the government as a political opposition to it, rather than an expression of a grievance mentality. These political perceptions of the government may be reinforced by the fact that the sangha samuluwa’s key organisers mark the joining of forces between the political sangha stalwarts of the Rajapaksa and Wickremesinghe camps.
While the brief presence of the Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa, and United Republican Front leader Patali Champika Ranawaka at the samuluwa, may further contribute to such interpretations, the post-event response is likely to widen the distrust between the government and the sangha. The post-event media coverage, especially, on social media shows how this gap is widening as coordinated campaigns (both pro-government and pro-opposition) polarise the discourse further. The government-leaning groups seem to ridicule the samuluwa, evoking the essence of the last point in the 10-point declaration announced at the event, that expressed its concerns about public disrespect of the sasana. These concerns on an alleged, coordinated campaign to mislead Gen Z youth by using social media as a large-scale defamatory drive against the Buddhist clergy are frequently heard.
The rhetoric within these speeches also suggest that while the so-called ‘post-ethnic moment’ many attributed to the Aragalaya had not fully materialised, what does seem to have emerged is a space for a milder form of Buddhist nationalism. This form of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism has become politically mainstream post-2022 and during the election campaigns of 2024, in contrast to the more militant strands of Buddhism associated with the Rajapaksa regimes. The speeches during the samuluwa reassured their commitment to coexistence, making sure to emphasise that their main grievances were with the ‘Sinhala Buddhists’ in government who were ‘disrespecting’ them and not minority groups. Symbolically, a key articulator of the militant version of nationalism, Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara Thero was seated at the back of the gathering, with no significant role.
These developments have together provided a much-awaited entry point for opposition political groups which mobilise Buddhist nationalism. Here, two strategies are observed. The more openly nationalist groups, the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) led by Namal Rajapaksa and the Sarvajana Balaya comprising Dilith Jaywaweera (and by association, Wimal Weerawansa, Udaya Gammanpila, and co.) did not attend the samuluwa. Their national credentials are intact, having consistently attacked the President and his party (especially the JVP) for being secular, atheist and deliberately seeking to undermine the cultural (and religious) foundations of the nation state. Other more ‘ambivalent’ actors such as the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB)’s Sajith Premadasa, and Champika Ranawaka (since his political reincarnation since 2022), were observed to be orbiting the space (despite no political figures being invited to the conference), trying to balance their appeal to the liberal right and their conservative supporters. Premadasa has since stated that immoral and vulgar statements made by certain MPs and ministers targeting the Buddhist Sangha, such as Minister Lal Kantha’s use of the word ‘savage’ to refer to a Buddhist monk, should be stopped immediately and legal action be taken in this regard.
The increasing confrontation between the Buddhist establishment and the NPP government indicates attempts by the latter to take on various competing centres of power within the polity. Besides the sangha, the government has also been observed to chip away at the power of the military and the civil service. In the NPP’s overarching strategy to elbow out contenders to state power, the challenge is to mobilise public support as it does so. In this, the sangha, due to its cultural entrenchment, plays a more resistant role to any undoing. The government’s current popularity, which hinges on its delivery and anti-corruption narratives, may prove to be fickle if it tries to overreach in its messaging to an ideologically ambiguous majority electorate.
Harindra B. Dassanayake and Rajni Gamage
This article was originally published on The Morning on 01 March 2026.
Image copyright © authors.
